Everything Wrong with Microsoft


It’s possible, even likely, that Microsoft will enter the darkest period in the company’s history. Darker, even, than July 2000, when it appeared the US government may dissolve your house that Costs built, and compel the company to be divided into 2 different companies.

The profits Microsoft earned in the quarter ending in March 2013, $20.5 billion, probably represents a high water mark for the company, a minimum of for the foreseeable future. In the most current quarter, the business’s earnings missed out on expectations, which Microsoft blamed on ongoing weakness in the market for PCs. There is no indicator that need for PCs is going to pick up once again– even Intel is forecasting sales will be flat, at best– and plenty that the world’s demand for PCs, or at least the kind that run Microsoft Windows, is in incurable decline.

Microsoft’s issue can be distilled to this: Computing is not confined to personal computer systems, where even now Microsoft preserves a near monopoly. More than ever, people are employing other gadgets to do the jobs that PCs once did: interaction, entertainment, and some section of their work. For a host of reasons, Microsoft failed to contend efficiently in the two markets that are disrupting its core business: initially, the cell phones that are supplanting PCs, and 2nd, the cloud computing resources that are essential to making those cell phones better, in a lot of cases, than PCs.

Microsoft does produce an important good: its operating system. However with the decline of the PC and the increase of the internet, cell phones, and cloud services, the company failed to anticipate or effectively dominate these alternate– and in a lot of cases remarkable– ways of getting computing done. We have reached out to Microsoft for comment and are waiting for a response.


Pulling back the curtain on the rot in Redmond

Everything that follows is, always, from anonymous sources, all of them veterans of Microsoft. Manufacturing their feedback with other publicly reported accounts yielded some valuable understandings about exactly what ails the company and the best ways to resolve it.

All the factors Steve Ballmer never should have become CEO in the first place

The timing of the handover of Microsoft from founder and technical genius Bill Gates to worker no. 30 and MBA dropout Steve Ballmer might hardly have been even worse for Ballmer. On December 29, 1999, Microsoft’s stock cost was at an all time high, and Microsoft was the most valuable company in the world. Then the stock began to fall. Seventeen days later on, Steve Ballmer took over, the stock exchange crashed quickly after, and Microsoft has actually never ever returned to its pre-bubble valuation.

In 1999, when Microsoft was a blue-chip company wringing a stable stream of earnings from the Windows monopoly, it may have made sense to put Ballmer, who was initially the business’s first business supervisor, in charge. But Microsoft continued to be an innovation company, and having a non-technical CEO suggested that Ballmer was ill-equipped to supervise the increasingly large and unwieldy development job that Windows had ended up being.

There is large evidence of Microsoft’s busted item pipeline, which stretches back a decade, at least: In 2004, Steve Jobs unveiled a variation of Mac OS X that incorporated numerous of the functions that Microsoft had guaranteed in its “Longhorn” reboot of Windows, a job that became so snarled that Ballmer ultimately needed to choose to toss out all the work his engineers had actually done and begin once again, delaying the release of Windows Vista (which was successful Longhorn) by a minimum of two years.

More just recently, Microsoft’s devastating effort to copy the iPad, the Surface RT, led to a $900 million write-down, and the company’s cloud services just aren’t operating as the “glue” that should connect the company’s online software application together, states one veteran. That contrasts greatly with Google, which has actually made inroads versus Microsoft by offering a tightly-integrated suite of “Google Apps” that include replacements for Office and Microsoft’s e-mail system, as well as cloud storage for information.

However maybe the most concrete presentation of Ballmer’s failure to be a “product man” as a CEO is the method the company has pushed touch-screen PCs and a touch-centric Windows user interface onto a public that has actually been trained for decades not to leave smudges on our PC screens (in contrast to tablets and phones) by touching them. (Given, Google has made the exact same error with its Chromebook Pixel.) Touch screen PCs and “convertibles”– heavy laptop/tablet hybrids– have both failed to sell as makers had hoped, adding to the general slump in the PC market.

Low morale and a harmful internal culture

Exactly what was at the root of Microsoft’s damaged product pipeline? As detailed by Vanity Fair’s expose on Microsoft’s lost decade, Ballmer was a tone-deaf supervisor. Microsoft’s “stack ranking” system of management, in which workers were graded on a curve that implied that one in 10 members of a group constantly needed to receive a score of “poor” even if all in a group was an A player, pitted employees versus one another, discouraged collaboration in between and even within teams, and slowed Microsoft’s development process to a crawl.

In 2012, Ballmer’s score amongst his own staff members was simply 46%, compared to Google CEO Larry Page’s 94% approval rating and Mark Zuckerberg’s 99%. Morale at the business is at an all-time low, says one source, and Microsoft has for years been losing its best executives and engineers to competitors like Google. Even when Microsoft hires gifted employees, the most gifted ones leave faster than the less talented ones, breaking down the general quality of Microsoft’s workers.

Microsoft has also for several years paid sub-par wages. This policy was born at a time when Microsoft might compensate employees with stock, however the company’s stock cost has been flat for a years. Meanwhile, business like Google are paying staff members as much as 23% more than the market average.

Shareholder restraints on innovation at Microsoft

Microsoft is a blue-chip stock with big institutional investors who expect dividends– which doesn’t jibe with a culture of risk-taking and innovation. As an outcome, the business tends to be more conservative in its decision-making, says a source. As an outcome, Microsoft’s last years has actually been almost entirely reactive. The company launched its rival to the iPod, the Zune, just prior to Apple rolled out the 5th generation of the iPod (along with the iPod Mini and Nano) and eventually terminated the Zune. Bing and Workplace 365, responses to Google’s search and Apps, respectively, came late sufficient that they appear predestined to permanently stay niche items. (Bing’s market share has to do with 18% to Google’s 67%.)

Perhaps the only area where Microsoft has competed successfully in the past years is gaming, with the Xbox, however shareholders were never pleased with the billions the business sunk into the job, and experts are now requiring Microsoft to sell that company totally.

Client and organizational restraints on development at Microsoft

Think of for a moment that Microsoft’s next CEO cleans home, and changes almost the totality of senior management (which in reality wouldn’t be possible provided all the institutional knowledge that would be lost). But if it were possible, here’s the timeless innovator’s problem Microsoft would deal with: Products that were sufficiently excellent copies of, state, rivals’ cloud services, would just eradicate many of Microsoft’s core companies all that much faster.

The software application known as Microsoft Server is one example: Consumers utilize it to run servers within their own information centers, whereas Amazon’s cloud services design is merely to sell you time on its servers. If Microsoft’s cloud services department were to copy Amazon Web Services, down to its hyper-competitive pricing, Microsoft’s sales force would revolt due to the fact that Microsoft’s cloud services would cannibalize sales of Windows Server; middle men who resell Windows Server to businesses and earn a living supporting it would be distressed to lose those sales; and financiers would be aghast at the hit Microsoft’s revenues would take. That Amazon and Google might ultimately remove this portion of Microsoft’s business in the absence of such a step barely matters to investors whose focus is on the next quarter.

Exactly what’s a Microsoft to do?

In spite of the myriad structural, historical and cultural constraints dealt with by Microsoft, there’s always a chance for a turnaround. That’s the subject of sequel of this series, which will certainly appear tomorrow: The seven-point strategy to conserve Microsoft, as told by veterans who deserted the company.